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1 . Yet the past several years have seen a number of thinkers contend that the hegemony of neoliberalism is waning -that it is giving way to . 2 Ettlinger, Nancy, and Christopher D. Hartmann. "Post/neo/liberalism in Relational Perspective." (2015); Peck, et al. "Postneoliberalism and Its Malcontents." (2010) . 3 Springer situates this argument and most of his previous critiques against neoliberalism in Foucauldian terms and using a largely Foucauldian method. See Springer (2010a) and 
Springer's Post/Neoliberalism
In two articles prior to "Postneoliberalism?" Springer considers the origins and structure of his concept of neoliberalism/ization 6 and argues that modern scholarship on the power of neoliberalism has focused on a treatment of "neoliberalism as monolithism" -that is to say it is treated as a single entity with static characteristics that can be avoided, subverted, moved This shifting interplay or converse approach to neoliberalism, as opposed to discreet or monolithic interpretations, should best be conceived of as a type of discourse 10 . In order to facilitate this approach, the noun neoliberalism should instead be transfigured into neoliberalization as a verb. Springer supposes this more accurately depicts neoliberalism as a concatenation of shifting practices which mutate and hybridize in accordance with the discursive backdrop from which the term is deployed. "Neoliberalizing practices are thus understood as necessarily and always overdetermined, contingent, polymorphic, open to intervention… subject to counter tendencies, and in a perpetual process of becoming." 11 Once we have adopted this dynamic understanding of "neoliberalism" 12 we can assess the procedures and characteristics it takes on through the polysemy it produces. In approaching neoliberalism as a discourse we no longer see it as a discreet concept which projects specific ends and limitations. At the same time, this approach gives us a target in which neoliberalizing practices can be contended with and emancipated from at a chokepoint in the process of discourse production 13 .
Postneoliberal scholarship has tended, according to Springer, to focus less on the process and more so on the institutional features by which neoliberalism can be resisted against "externally". Meaning that a crisis or collapse of the variety encountered in the 2008 sub-prime mortgage and financial crisis in the United States would suggest that neoliberalism has weakened to such an extent that 'to resist' would be to assess the failures in market procedures and/or breakdowns in governmental institutions and suggest alternatives accordingly 14 . This style of treatment is tantamount to labelling neoliberalism as an ideology of tenets -which can be theoretically contradicted -or a set of policies which can be redacted, eliminated, or reconceived.
Springer's assessment of the scholarship is quite accurate -Peck, et al. see neoliberalism's death as coming about through a resistance to globalizing effects of social and political policy 15 while
Radcliffe has identified posteneoliberalism with a "shift in development thinking and delivery to stress a rights-based articulation of individual capacities and wellbeing, nature, and resource distribution" 16 . In conceiving of neoliberalism in these terms, postneoliberal scholarship has tended to place discreet origins, aims, and conclusions on neoliberalizing practices. More 12 Springer (2010a) , (2010b), (2011), (2012), (2014) continues to use the term "neoliberalism" after introducing the concept of neoliberalization. This is presumably done for the ease of the reader and so as to view neoliberalism as a type of multifaceted noun that symbolizes a set of discourses between neoliberalizing practices. Springer briefly laments that "our language and writing has not caught up" to this type of conceptual analysis of terms (2014, p. 7). 13 Springer (2012) Building off of this concept of market reactions -and I believe this is Springer's point as wellneoliberalism has no specific "end" to achieve or "beginning" to necessarily refer back to. We 17 Ibid. p. 9 18 Ibid. p. 8; for more on neoliberal "roll-outs" also see McCarthy & Prudham (2004) 19 Hendrikse & Sidway (2010 ) p. 2038 -2039 cannot say, for instance, that neoliberalism began when governmental policy y was adopted or will necessarily end when market relation z concludes.
What is at stake in Springer's analysis is a normative assessment of neoliberalism and the potential for political emancipation. As has been repeatedly mentioned: postneoliberal scholarship has failed to account for the dynamic and expansive typography of neoliberalizations and, in so doing, cannot help but rediscover itself in the discourse of neoliberalism. Springer subsequently states that he wishes to "contribute to the theorizations that might enable more forceful critiques of the power of neoliberalism." 20 The Occupy movement for Springer served as one specific example that pointed toward the inequality inherent in neoliberal practices; the market influence and corporate favoritism that is often associated with neoliberalism; and the divisive nature of neoliberal governmental deployment that is characterized by the use violence
to adjust for what it sees as "peacekeeping" against "disobedient adversaries" 21 .
Neoliberalizations, Springer states, "…exacerbate the concentration of wealth, reshape political sovereignty, and reorganize economies along increasingly exclusionary lines…"
22
The hope is that the exploitative capitalistic underpinning of neoliberalism gives way to movements in the same vein as Occupy -movements that seek to replace the discourse of neoliberalism with a new discourse which has, as its primary concern, a more egalitarian social condition 23 . Springer explains that social, political, and economic resistance against neoliberalism is far from being negated in his view but is rather a completely necessary form of While I am sympathetic to Springer's normative position, I find it to be summarily vague and consisting of overly broad accusations against a series of practices which we are assuming constitute neoliberalizations. Further still I believe that while Springer's goal is a noble one -to change our sociopolitical world into something of a more radically democratized and egalitarian project 25 -I am not entirely convinced his treatment of neoliberalism is sufficient enough to provide the means by which we can arrive at such conclusions. Rather, I propose that a firm investigation into Michel Foucault's treatment of neoliberalism lends a more helpful take on how to understand a potential 'end' or at least how to best conceive of the sheer scope and power of whatever postneoliberalism -something 'beyond' neoliberalism -is in practice.
Foucault and Neoliberalism
The As far as a Foucauldian understanding of veridiction is concerned; there is nothing at odds with Springer's concern for neoliberalism as monolithism -in fact Springer's characterization of neoliberalism looks quite strong here. Veridiction is to be found within market relations (Terranova, 2009; Oksala 2013 ) -or rather: the principals of the market "mark out" a reality 35 in which we can verify or falsify certain knowledges behind practices and, in doing so, allow us to justify aims and functions (jurisdiction) with what can be verified as true 36 .
This understanding of the market as the site of veridiction is exactly the type of adaptability that
Springer observers in his analysis of neoliberalism. There is no one specific market crises which can befall a dynamic rendition of neoliberalism that sees the cyclical movement of the market itself as the instrument of truth. Crises -perhaps better described as unpredictable social, political, and economic fluctuations -, as Springer notes 37 in accordance with Foucault 38 , sit at the very basis of the context in which of neoliberal governmentality has developed.
If we are to consider neoliberalism as having its foundations in crisis, than Springer's assessment of postneoliberalism's shortcomings has quite a bit in common with Foucault's explication of the nigh-inescapable power of neoliberalism. Indeed, I believe that this contention of neoliberalism as crises is not altogether inaccurate -the difficultly, however, arises from Springer's lack of consideration as to the sheer force that such an analysis carries with it.
Postneoliberal scholarship has struggled, in Springer's estimate, because it has focused on a conception of neoliberalism as a monolithic and static entity, but I believe that Springer does not 35 For a more detailed note on the Foucauldian ontology of governmental regimes of truth "marking reality" see Foucault (2007) p. 46-49; 108. 36 Foucault (2008) p. 53 Presented as one of the formative aspects of liberalism, p. 240 as American neoliberalism's tendency to appropriate economic truths derived from the market to non-market areas. 37 Springer (2014) p. 7 38 Foucault (2007) p. 37; (2008) p. 195-197, 216 push this point hard enough. For Foucault, neoliberalism's jurisdiction is constantly expanding and shifting; finding new areas of reality to demarcate via economic rationality which can be carried forward into new, aleatory "non-rational conducts" and areas outside of market analysis 39 .
To be blunt: if Foucault's treatment of neoliberalism's power in terms of veridiction and jurisdiction meshes with Springer's -and I believe it does -then neoliberalism cannot be challenged by merely expanding its conceptualization into a form of discourse. This is a categorical mistake -this is the deployment of neoliberalism into a new realm of discussion. A discursive expansion is just that -an expansion of the scope of jurisdiction that adds to strength of neoliberalism; Springer has done less to assess the potential end of neoliberalism and instead furthered its potential ends as a field of discourse. In transforming neoliberalism into the verb As briefly mentioned above there is also the concern of Springer's normative critique of what is at stake in an emancipation from neoliberalism. What made the question of postneoliberalism so problematic for Springer was that such a notion, as it was approached in scholarship, missed the mark and thus failed to move us any closer to the scholars' intended sense of emancipation from neoliberal practices. Here "emancipation" is understood as a "perpetual contestation of the alienating effects of contemporary neoliberalization." 42 As we have already seen these alienating effects are wide spread, vague, and subsequently capable of being applied to any governmentality or historical regime of power rather than solely neoliberalism. For this very reason I propose that Springer's argument against a conception of neoliberalism as monolithic can be turned against his normative theory. Springer's normative position views neoliberalism as a universalized, hegemonic force which, somehow -despite its dynamic characterization -creates curiously discreet and static effects (and a seemingly large number of them at that). In fact, it seems reasonable to conclude that given the sheer range of Springer's potential alienating effects of neoliberalism; we are left with a type of monolithic normative conception of neoliberalism that functions as little more than a grand source of all great political, social, and economic ills and inequalities we can identify.
Conclusion
As unsatisfying as it may be, the objective of this paper was not to serve as a bastion of hope for a possible recapitulation of postneoliberal theory; or even offer a new method of emancipation from and beyond neoliberalism. Instead the goal has been fairly modest. namely greater levels of equality and less alienating socioeconomic conditions. This area of counter-conducts has only recently come to the forefront of scholarship on Foucauldian resistance (Cadman 2009 , Davidson 2011 , Ball & Olimedo 2012 ) and hopefully we will see expanded study on its connection with neoliberal emancipation in time.
While neoliberalism may not collapse due to a sudden crises or redaction of some specific set of policies, it seems -on Springer's account -it can be blamed for nearly any social ill we can conceive and thus serve as an endless excuse for resistances from any angle. I agree with Carl Death's brief assessment of Foucault on the matter:
we need to escape the dilemma of being either for or against. One can, after all, be face to face, and upright. Working with a government doesn't imply either a subjection or a blanket acceptance. One can work with and be intransigent at the same time. I would even say that the two things go together.
